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Settlement Agreements and the
Collateral Order Doctrine:
A Step in the Wrong Direction?
DigitalEquip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the increase in lawsuits each year, the fact that a majority of cases are
concluded by settlement is seen by many as "a tribute to both the trial bench and
the practicing bar."2 In furtherance of this desirable end, the judiciary has
typically upheld and enforced settlement agreements whenever possible Against
this backdrop, the Digital court faced the issue of whether an order rescinding a
settlement agreement which provided a "right not to stand trial" was immediately
appealable pursuant to the collateral order doctrine.
II. FAMTS AND HOLDING
Desktop Direct, Inc. ("Plaintiff') brought a suit in a Utah District Court
alleging unfair competition and trademark infringement by Digital Equipment
Corporation ("Defendant"), 4 Prior to trial, the parties reached a settlement, and
Plaintiff sought a voluntary dismissal of the suit.5 Later, however, Plaintiff
moved to vacate the dismissal and to rescind the settlement agreement citing fraud
and misrepresentation on Defendant's part during the settlement negotiations.6
The district court granted Plaintiffs motion on January 5, 1993, rescinding
the settlement agreement and allowing Plaintiff to withdraw its motion to
dismiss.7 Defendant subsequently filed motions to reconsider and to stay pending
appeal.8 After the district court declined to reconsider the ruling or to stay its
order to vacate the dismissal, Defendant appealed.9
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, before considering the merits of
Defendant's motion to stay, determined that as a threshold matter, it must consider
whether it had jurisdiction to adjudge an appeal from the district court's order. °
The court, in reviewing § 1291," determined that the district court's order was

1. 114 S. Ct. 1992 (1994).
2. Alyson M. Weiss, Federal Jurisdiction to Enforce a Settlement Agreement After Vacating a
Dismissal Order Under Rule 60(b)(6), 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 2137, 2137 (1989).

3. Id. at 2137.
4. Desktop Direct, Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 993 F.2d 755, 756 (10th Cir. 1993).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. The District Court found that "a fact finder could determine that the defendant failed to
disclose material facts during the settlement negotiations which would have resulted in rejection of the
settlement offer by the plaintiff." Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 757.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988). This statute provides, inpart, that "[t]he courts of appeals (other
than the United States Courts of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from
final decisions
of the district
the United States."
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"not final for purposes of § 1291. '" Defendant, conceding that the order was
not final under § 1291, argued that the case fell under the collateral order
exception to the final judgment rule, first established in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.
Loan Corp.'3
The appellate court, recognizing its deviation from the holdings set forth in
other courts of appeals, 4 found that although the district court's order was "the
final word on the subject addressed"' 5 and was "completely separate from the
merits of the action," 6 the order failed to satisfy the "important issue" portion
of the second Cohen requirement 7 and failed to satisfy the third Cohen
requirement, that the decision be "effectively unreviewable on appeal."' 8 The
appellate court, therefore, concluded that the order was not immediately appealable
under the "collateral order doctrine," and as a result, the court lacked jurisdiction
over the appeal.' 9
After granting certiorari to resolve the conflict among the various courts of
appeals,"0 the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal's ruling.2' The
Supreme Court determined that, contrary to the Defendant's characterization of the
settlement agreement as a "right not to be tried,"22 the settlement agreement in
this case was analogous to the forum selection clause at issue in Lauro Lines
S.R.L. v. Chasser,2 3 which was determined to be "effectively vindicable 24 on

12. Desktop Direct, Inc., 993 F.2d at 757.
13. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). To fall within the Cohen exception, an order must satisfy three
requirements: "It must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue
completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a
final judgment." Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 497 (1989).
14. See Forbus v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 958 F.2d 1036, 1039-40 (1 1th Cir. 1992); Grillet v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 927 F.2d 217, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1991); Janneh v. GAF Corp., 887 F.2d 432,
434-36 (2d Cir. 1989).
15. Desktop Direct,Inc., 993 F.2d at 757 (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1983)).
16. Id.(citing Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 498 (1989)).
17. Id. at 758. The court stated that although out-of-court settlements are desirable, the
expectation that no trial will occur after entering the settlement agreement is insufficiently important.
In support of its conclusion, the court found that aside from the qualified immunity, "only when there
is an explicit constitutional or statutory guarantee or a compelling public policy rational does the
Supreme Court permit an interlocutory appeal." Id. See, e.g., Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651
(1977).
18. Id. at 757, 760 (citing Lauro, 490 U.S. at 498). The court stated that "[florcing parties to
go through what may turn out to be a wasted trial is just one of the inevitable costs of the final
judgment rule." Id.at 760.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Chaput v. Unisys Corp., 964 F.2d 1299, 1301 (2nd Cir 1992); but see, e.g.,
Transtech Indus., Inc. v. A & Z Septic Clean, 5 F.3d 51 (3rd Cir. 1993).
Digital Equip. Corp., 114 S.Ct at 2004.
21.
22. See, e.g., Abneyv. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977). The protection from double jeopardy
found in the Fifth Amendment protects defendants against second prosecutions for the same offense
after
acquittal or conviction. BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY 340 (6th ed. 1990). This Constitutional
guarantee is an example of a "right not to stand trial."
23. 490 U.S. 495 (1989).
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final judgment and hence not immediately appealable.25 Furthermore, the Court
determined that any "immunity" which the settlement could be characterized as
providing was insufficiently important to warrant application of the collateral order
doctrine.26 As a result, the Supreme Court held that a refusal to enforce a
settlement agreement claimed to shelter a party from suit altogether did not supply
a basis for immediate appeal under § 1291 27
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
To fully understand the Digitalholding, and more importantly, the Supreme
Court's reluctance in expanding the collateral order doctrine, one must have an
understanding not only of the collateral order doctrine, but of the traditional basis
for appellate review from which the collateral order doctrine varies.
A. The "FinalJudgment Rule:" 28 US.C. § 1291
Appellate jurisdiction is bestowed upon the federal appellate courts by 28
U.S.C. § 1291.2' Section 1291, referred to as the final judgment rule, grants
appellate jurisdiction to all final orders.29 Although the term "finality" has
evaded exact definition,3" the generally cited description is that a final judgment
is a decision by the district court that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves
nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment."'" Examples of "final
judgments" are orders granting summary judgments,32 orders dismissing cases on
the grounds of forum non conveniens,33 directed verdicts and judgments
notwithstanding the verdict. 34
The policy reasons behind requiring a final judgment have been discussed by
many courts throughout this century. One major purpose for requiring a final
judgment is to avoid "piecemeal litigation" and promote judicial economy.35 By
disallowing repeated interruptions of district court proceedings, the final judgment

24. Lauro Lines, 490 U.S. at 501.
25. DigitalEquip. Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2002.
26. Id.
27. Id.at 2004.
28. See supra note 11.
29. Margaret Anderson, The Immediate Appealability of Rule 11 Sanctions, 59 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 683, 687 (1991).
30. Nancy Berman, Monetary Sanctions Against Attorneys for Discovery Abuses in Federal
Court: When Can They Be Appealed?, 9 CARDOzO L. REv. 1021, 1029-30 (stating that it is "difficult
to formulate precisely what constitutes a 'final decision"').
Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
31.
United States v. Brook Contracting Co., 759 F.2d 320, 323 (3d Cir. 1985).
32.
33. Ruffv. Gay, 67 F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1933), affd, 292 U.S. 25 (1934).
34. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 50.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974) (stating that "[r]estricting appellate
35.
review to 'final decisions' prevents the debilitating effect on judicial administration caused by
piecemeal appellate disposition of what is, in practical consequence, but a single controversy").
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rule not only fosters efficient and orderly disposition of claims, it allows for full
development of a record for subsequent review.36 In addition, it reduces a
party's ability to utilize the process of successive appeals which could "drain their
opponent's desire and capacity to pursue meritorious claims."37
Another strong policy reason for the final judgment rule is the maintenance
of the relationship between the district court, as initial adjudicator, and the
appellate court as a reviewing body.38 As the court in Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Risjord 9 pronounced, "[plermitting piecemeal appeals would undermine
the independence of the district judge, as well as the special role that an individual
plays in our judicial system."4 By deferring appeals until the resolution of the
proceeding below, the final judgment rule enhances the likelihood of a sound
appellate review of the various issues in the litigation. 4'
Despite the strong policy support for the final judgment rule, there exists
several shortcomings, two of which have been addressed particularly by
commentators.42 One major concern is that trial court rulings "may often have
serious and continuous effects which cannot be remedied on appeal from the final
judgment long in the future." 43 For example, district court rulings which grant
or deny preliminary injunctions, or determine whether a suit may be maintained
' 44
In
as a class action, can "modify a party's rights swiftly and irremediably.
is
is
taken
action
corrective
any
which
with
these situations, the promptness
4
Another
the
litigants.
to
justice
assure
to
ability
essential to an appellate court's
concern is that even if a party's rights are not significantly threatened, a district
court may erroneously rule on a motion which would have forestalled any trial at
all, thus forcing the parties to expend substantial amounts of money and time for
a worthless trial. 46 Alternatively, the district court's error may "taint subsequent
events as to require reversal and a new trial. 47

Riyaz A. Kanji, The Proper Scope of PendentAppellate Jurisdictionin the CollateralOrder
36.
Doctrine, 100 YALE L.J. 511, 512 (1990) (citing Richardson-Merrel, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430
(1985); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981); Cobbledick v. United
States, 309 U.S. 323, 325-26 (1940)).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 449 U.S. 368 (1981).
40. Id.at 374.
41. See DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 129 (1962).
42. Kanji, supra note 36, at 513.
43. R. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATEs 79 (2d ed. 1989).
44. Kanji, supra note 36, at 513.
45. Paul D. Carrington, Towarda FederalCivilInterlocutoryAppeals Act, 47 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., 165 (1984).
46. Martin H. Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75
COLUM. L. REv. 89, 98 (1975).
47. Kanji, supra note 36, at 513.
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B. Exceptions to the FinalJudgment Rule: § 1292(a) & (b), Rule
54(b), and the CollateralOrder Doctrine
In light of the apparent flaws in the final judgment rule, Congress and the
courts have carved out exceptions which permit interlocutory appeals.48 The
most frequently invoked statutory exception to the final judgment rule is §
1292(a), which authorizes appeals from interlocutory orders49 of the district court
affecting injunctions, receiverships, and rights and liabilities in admiralty cases.5"
Another exception is § 1292(b) which allows for the district court to certify an
order so the appellate court may consider the issue on an interlocutory basis.5
Rule 54(b) allows for immediate appeal from an order from the district court
judge which is conclusive as to "one or more but fewer than all of the claims or
parties" in a litigation.52 The last exception to the final judgment rule, relevant
to this Note, is the court-created collateral order doctrine.
The collateral order doctrine was first established in Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp.53 Cohen was a shareholder's derivative suit in which the
central issue was whether a New Jersey statute which rendered an unsuccessful
plaintiff liable for the defendant's litigation costs and further required the plaintiff
to post a security bond for those costs in anticipation of litigation was applicable
in federal court.54 The district court refused to require the plaintiff to pay the
security bond and immediate appeal was sought.55 The Supreme Court held that
the order was immediately appealable, even though it was not technically "final"
under § 1291, because the order "finally determined the claims of right separable
from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied
review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate

48. Id.
"Interlocutory" is defined as "[siomething intervening between the commencement and the
49.
end of a suit which decides some point or matter, but is not a final decision of the whole controversy."
"Interlocutory appeal" is defined as "[a]n appeal of a matter which is not determinable of the
controversy, but which is necessary for a suitable adjudication of the merits." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 563 (6th ed. 1990).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1988). Section 1291(a)(1) states that "the courts of appeals shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from [i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts .. . granting, continuing,
modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions." Section
1292(a)(2) states that appeals will arise from "interlocutory orders appointing receivers, or refusing
orders to wind up receiverships or take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof, such as directing sales
or other disposals of property." Section 1291(a)(3) states that an appeal will lie from "interlocutory
orders ... determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to an admiralty case in which appeals
from final decrees are allowed."
51.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988) (stating that the district judge shall certify that the order involves
"a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion and
that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation").
52. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
337 U.S. 541 (1949).
53.
54. Id.at 543.
Id.
55.
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consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated."56 In creating the
collateral order doctrine, the Court declared that the doctrine was not to be
understood as an exception to § 1291, rather it was a "practical construction" of
it" which affected a narrow class of decisions that did not terminate the
58
litigation, but must, in the interest of "achieving a healthy legal system," be
treated as final.
After the Court's initial enunciation of the collateral order doctrine, however,
it appeared that the newly created Cohen analysis would notably erode the final
judgment rule.5 9 Under the Cohen analysis, orders directing the defendant to pay
6
the costs of notice in a class action,6" orders denying a motion to reduce bail, '
and an order denying a motion to proceed in forma pauperis" were all
considered qualified for interlocutory appeal pursuant to the collateral order
doctrine.
However, the criteria set forth in Cohen was further refined in Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay,63 preventing the demise of the final judgment rule.' In
rejecting an immediate appeal of a denial of class certification, the Court
articulated a three-prong test for analyzing interlocutory appeals under the
collateral order doctrine. The order sought to be appealed must: (1) "conclusively
determine the disputed question;" (2) "resolve an important issue completely
separate from the merits of the65action;" and (3) "be effectively unreviewable on
appeal from a final judgment.
Since the Court's ruling in Coopers & Lybrand, the Court's statement in
Cohen that the doctrine applied only to a "narrow class" of decisions has appeared
to hold true.66 Of the orders considered for interlocutory appeal pursuant to the
collateral order doctrine, the Court has found that a denial of the defense of
absolute immunity in a civil rights action,67 the granting of a stay of a federal
6
court lawsuit while a parallel state court suit proceeds, " the pretrial denial of a

56.

Id. at 546.

57. Id.
58. Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 326.
59. Redish, supra note 46, at 111-13.
60. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (commenting in dicta that an order denying a motion
61.
to reduce bail would be appealable under the Cohen analysis).
62. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States District Court, 339 U.S. 844 (1950).
63. 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
64. Michael Solimine, Revitalizing InterlocutoryAppeals in the FederalCourt, 58 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1165, 1170 (1990).
65. Coopers & Lybrand 437 U.S. at 468. The Coopers & Lybrand court held that the denial
was inherently non-final, it was entangled with the merits of the case, and was subject to review after
the final judgment by the plaintiff or intervening class member. See Solimine, supra note 64, at 1170
(discussing the Court's holding).
66. Solimine, supra note 64, at 1170.
67. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1981) (holding that the denial of an absolute immunity
from suit was immediately appealable).
68. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
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qualified immunity defense in a civil rights action, 69 and an adverse ruling on a
double jeopardy claim7" were all immediately appealable under the collateral
order doctrine. However, in contrast, for example, the Court declared in Lauro
Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser1 that a refusal to give effect to a contractual forum
selection clause failed the third criteria in that the desire to be sued in another
forum was "adequately vindicable," though "not perfectly" so, after a final
judgment.72
In recent times, the Court has continued to limit the availability of the
collateral order doctrine to those narrow cases where § 1291's jurisdictional
requirement would, if rigidly applied, "eliminate the role of the appellate courts
altogether with respect to claims deemed essential to litigants."7 Utilizing the
Supreme Court's analysis of the collateral order doctrine as a guide, several courts
of appeal have recently wrestled with the issue of whether a district court's refusal
to enforce a settlement agreement was immediately appealable pursuant to the
collateral order doctrine.
C. The CollateralOrder Doctrine and Refusals to Enforce Settlement
Agreements
In Janneh v. GAF Corp.74 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed
the issue of whether the refusal to enforce a settlement agreement reached in an
employment discrimination action was immediately appealable under the collateral
order doctrine. 75 Utilizing the Court's three-prong test enunciated in Coopers &
Lybrand,the court determined that the refusal to enforce the settlement agreement
was immediately appealable under the Cohen doctrine.76
The court first determined that the district court judge's order refusing to
enforce the settlement agreement was clearly made with the intent that it would
be the "final word on the subject addressed, 7 7 therefore, satisfying the first prong
of the Cohen doctrine. The court further stated that the order satisfied the second
prong in that it resolved an important issue separate from the merits of Janneh's,
Refusing to enforce the settlement
employment discrimination claim. 78
agreement, according to the court, was "important" because it deprived GAF Corp.
of its bargained-for right to avoid trial by enforcing the settlement agreement.79

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Mitchell v. Forseyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
490 U.S. 495 (1989).
Id. at 501.
Kanji, supra note 36, at 518.
887 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 865 (1990).
Id. at 434.
Id. at 436.
Janneh, 887 F.2d at 434 (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 12-13).
Id. at 434-35.
Id.
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The right to avoid trial via a settlement agreement "implicates our nation's
strongest judicial and public policies favoring out-of-court settlement."'
In
addition, arriving at an out of court settlement furthers judicial administration by
relieving the overwhelming dockets and avoiding timely and expensive
litigation."1
Finally, the court determined that an asserted right not to go to trial could be
based on a contract between two parties.8 2 The court found that if the party
attempting to enforce the settlement agreement were forced to litigate, the right
to avoid trial, gained through contract negotiations, would be lost irretrievably. 3
The court, therefore, concluded that the third and final prong had been satisfied
and an appeal could be heard pursuant to the collateral order doctrine.8 4
Following the court's decision, several other courts of appeals similarly found that
the refusal to enforce a settlement agreement was immediately appealable under
the collateral order doctrine.85
However, despite this precedent, other courts of appeals have found precisely
the opposite. 6 These courts have found the collateral order doctrine unavailable
for fact-specific reasons, such as the lack of distinctness from the underlying
merits of the lawsuit and the availability of effective post-judgement review,"
as well as unavailable on policy grounds. 8
In light of the conflicting decisions by the various courts of appeals on the
issue of interlocutory appeal and the refusal to enforce settlement agreements, the
instant case provided the Supreme Court an opportunity not only to resolve the
split among the appellate courts, but also to reaffirm and reiterate the narrow
boundaries of the collateral order doctrine.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Digital, the Supreme Court began its analysis by reaffirming its position
that the collateral order doctrine is a narrow exception to the final judgment
rule. 9 The Court stated that the issue of appealability "is to be determined for

80. Id.
81.
Id.
82. Id.at 436.
83. Id.(citing Local 771, I.A.T.S.E. v. RKO Gen., Inc., 546 F.2d 1107, 1112 (2nd Cir. 1977)).
84. Id.
85. See Forbus v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 958 F.2d 1036 (11th Cir. 1992); Grillet v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co. 927 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1991).
86. See, e.g., Transtech Industries, Inc. v. A & Z Septic Clean, 5 F.3d 51 (3rd Cir. 1993);
Desktop Direct v. Digital Equip. Corp, 993 F.2d 755 (10th Cir. 1993).
87.
Transtech Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d at 57. The court also discussed the fact that the settlement
was between the settlor-defendant and the EPA, an entity who was not a party in the action.
88. See, e.g., Transtech, 5 F.3d at 57-58. The court stated that allowing interlocutory appeals
pursuant to the collateral order doctrine in instances when a district court refuses to enforce a
settlement agreement "undermine[s] the final judgment rule and expand[s] the immunity concept
beyond that which the Supreme Court has approved." Id.at 57.
89. Digital Equip. Corp., 114 S. CL at 1996.
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the entire category to which a claim belongs," 90 explicitly rejecting a case-by-case
determination of appealability. 9'
With this foundation laid, the Court began its analysis by averring to the
court of appeal's determination that the order vacating a dismissal and thereby
rescinding the settlement agreement was the "final word on the subject addressed"
and that it resolved an issue completely separate from the merits of the lawsuit.92
Although the Supreme Court stated that the aforementioned conclusions were not
beyond question,93 it declined to take issue with them since Desktop did not
attempt to defend the court of appeal's judgment on those points. More
importantly, the Supreme Court concluded that the failure to satisfy the third
Cohen criteria94 was sufficient to foreclose the availability of an immediate
appeal. 95
In discussing the third Cohen requirement, the Court noted that orders which
deny certain immunities are "strong candidates" for immediate appeal.96
However, the Court took issue with Digital's broad contention that a party's
characterization of a district court's decision as a denial of an irreparable "right
not to stand trial" was "sufficient and necessary" for a collateral appeal. 97 First,
the Court held that mere identification of some interest that would be irretrievably
lost was insufficient to meet the third Cohen condition since "almost every pretrial
or trial order might be called 'effectively unreviewable' in the sense that relief
from error can never extend to rewrite history."" Secondly, the Court stated that
characterizing something as "a right not stand trial" was similarly insufficient to
warrant immediate appeal. 99 The Court reasoned that such a characterization was
suspect since the description could loosely be applied to a multitude of claims,' 00
such as a court's lack of personal jurisdiction,' which are not immediately

90.

Id.

91. Id.(citing Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 405 (1977)).
92. Id.
93. Id.
at 1996 n.2 (discussing the possible fact based arguments against satisfaction of the first
and second Cohen criteria).
94. Id.The Court's formulation of the third Cohen condition was that "the decision on an
at 1996. Note that the
'important' question be 'effectively unreviewable' upon final judgment." Id.
traditionally quoted formulation of the collateral order doctrine set forth in Coopers & Lybrand,
includes the "importance element in the second requirement." See supra note 63.
95. Id.
at 1996.
96. Id. at 1993.
97. Id.at 1996-97.
98. Id.at 1998.
99. Id.at 1999.
100. Id.at 1998. The Court states that the description of a "right not to be tried" could be
applied to claims that "an action is barred on claim preclusion, that no material fact is in dispute and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or merely that the complaint fails to state
at 1998.
a claim." Id.
101. See Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S 517, 524 (1988).
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appealable. Therefore, the courts of appeals should "view claims of a 'right not
to be tried' with skepticism, if not a jaundiced eye. ' '
The Court further reasoned that even if Mitchell v. Forseyth0 3 could not
be squared with MidlandAsphalt Corp. v. United States, " thereby opening the
possibility that an explicit statutory or constitutional grant of immunity is not
necessary for immediate appeal, this possibility alone did not explain why the
privately negotiated right not to stand trial provided in the settlement agreement
was in need of more protection than the implicit right not to stand trial which
arguably could be found in the aforementioned claims." 5 Although Digital
argued that the clarity with which the "right not to stand trial" was embodied in
the settlement agreement warranted immediate appeal, the Court reiterated that
"the availability of collateral order appeal[s] must be determined at a higher level
of generality."'0 6 Furthermore, the Court stated that it was deciding this case
"on the assumption that if Digital prevailed here, any district court order denying
effect to a settlement agreement could be appealed immediately."' 7
According to the Court, the fundamental response to the claim that an
agreement's provision for immunity from suit is distinguishable from other
arguable rights to be trial-free, is that the immunity by agreement is insufficiently
important to warrant immediate appeal. 8 The Court stated that when an
immunity is rooted in a statute or in the Constitution, there is little room for the
judiciary branch to "gainsay its importance."'0 9 Furthermore, the Court stated
that simply because the immunity from suit is embodied in a private agreement,
this does not conclusively determine that the "right not to be tried" is more
"important" than other rights which arguably confer a right not to be sued, that
this right is worthy of an exception to the final judgment rule, or that it is even
important to the party to whose benefit such a provision works."0 The Court
further agreed with the court of appeal's characterization of the right conferred by
the settlement agreement in the instant case as being similar to the forum selection
clause in Lauro Lines, and therefore, must similarly fail."' Finally, the Court
stated that disallowing immediate appeal was not contrary to the public policy of

102.

Digital Equip. Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 1999.

103.

472 U.S. 511 (1985) (holding that a denial of a qualified immunity is immediately

appealable).

104.
489 U.S. 794 (1989) (holding that only explicit statutory and constitutional immunities may
be immediately appealable).
105.
See supra note 100. Digital argued that because the settlement agreement offered an
explicit "right not to stand trial," it should be immediately appealable. The Court stated that "we
cannot attach much significance one way or another to the supposed clarity of the agreement's terms
in this case." DigitalEquip. Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2000.
106.

Id.

107.

Id.

108.
109.
110.

Id.at 2001.
Id.
Id.

111.

Id. at 2002 (discussing Lauro Lines, 490 U.S. 495 (1989)).
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encouraging pre-trial dispute resolution because such a ruling would not have any
adverse effect on a party's willingness to settle." 2
In further support of its decision, the Court stated that even if the
"importance" requirement were not included in the Cohen analysis, a district
court's refusal to enforce a settlement agreement would be "adequately vindicable"
on final judgment."' In addition, the Court reasoned that the "right not to be
tried" was rarely the essence of a negotiated settlement agreement."" In further
support of its conclusion that adequate vindication is possible, the Court stated that
parties to a settlement agreement have other avenues to recourse, unlike those
dependant on immunities rooted in statutes and the Constitution." 5 Parties could
not only sue for breach of contract, but they could seek Rule 11 sanctions if the
party seeking to renege the settlement is doing so because of later disappointment
with the settlement terms." 6
Finally, the Court stated that it was not ruling on the availability of other
interlocutory routes, such as § 1292(b)." 7 Furthermore, the Court noted in a
footnote to its decision that in light of Title 9, § 16,"' it was not deciding that
a privately conferred right could never supply the basis of a collateral order
appeal." 9 Accordingly, the Court concluded that refusal to enforce a settlement
agreement claimed to shelter a party from suit altogether does not supply the basis
for immediate appeal under § 1291.120
V. COMMENT
Given the Supreme Court's insistence on maintaining the collateral order
doctrine as a "narrow" exception to the final judgment rule,' 2' Digital, as
representative of that policy, falls right in line. In contrast to the Court's
continued interest in preserving the integrity of the "final judgment rule" as
exemplified by Digital, however, is the competing judicial and societal interests
favoring out-of-court settlement agreements. Imperative to this latter interest is

112. Id.at 2003.
113. Id. The court contrasted the reviewability of the district court's order refusing to enforce
a settlement agreement with the irreparable right to be free of a second trial on a criminal charge
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
114. Id. The Court stated that this limiting exposure to liability was fully vindicable on final
appeal.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.at 2004.
118. 9 U.S.C. § 16 (1988). This statute holds that an immediate appeal may be had when a
district court rejects a party's assertion that, under the Arbitration Act, a case belongs before a
commercial arbitrator and not in court.
119.

Digital Equip. Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2002 n.7.

120.
121.

Id. at 2004.
Id.at 1996.
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the availability of judicial means to "encourage and facilitate compromise."''
When a district court refuses to give credence to a provision in a contract calling
for alternative dispute resolution (hereinafter ADR), or refuses to enforce an
agreement reached via ADR means, the benefit of the collateral order doctrine
becomes immediately apparent. Appellate review, in these instances, ensures that
the controversy in question must go to trial.
A Congressional example reflecting society's interest in minimizing the
pressure on courts in favor of ADR is provided in 9 U.S.C. § 16.23 The statute
provides that when a District Court rejects a party's assertion that, under the
Arbitration Act, a case belongs before a commercial arbitrator and not in court,
that order can be immediately appealed pursuant to the collateral order
doctrine. 24
Given the opportunity in Digital to address an issue concerning which
Congress has not enacted a statute, the Court favored maintaining the narrow
bounds of § 1291, rather than further "facilitating and encouraging" settlement by
allowing immediate appeals of orders rescinding settlement agreements.'25 In
stating that the passage of 9 U.S.C. § 16 "by no means suggests that they [the
Supreme Court] should now be more willing to make similar judgments for
themselves," 2 6 the Digital Court stands in stark contrast to the numerous courts
which have found the rights provided in a settlement agreement "important"
enough to warrant immediate appeal.
In Janneh v. GAF Corp., the court stated that "one crucial benefit of a
settlement agreement . . . is the avoidance of trial." 27 When the district court
in Janneh determined that a settlement was never reached, the court of appeals
found the issue important because the order involved the "deprivation of
significant rights, namely, GAF's bargained-for right to avoid trial by enforcing
the settlement agreement."' 28 The right to avoid trial, according to the Janneh
court, "implicates our nation's strong judicial and public policies favoring out of
court settlements." 29 The Digital court, however, fails to fully consider that
the right to avoid trial embodied in the settlement agreement is imperative for the
protection of the parties involved. Without such a provision, the sense of finality
and resolution stemming from the agreement is, at best, illusory.
Furthermore, the prospect that the appellate court would find the settlement
agreement enforceable after trial has occurred offers little comfort. As the Janneh
court stated, "[r]eversing the order after an appeal from a final judgment would

122. Alyson M. Weiss, FederalJurisdictionto Enforce a Settlement Agreement After Vacating
a Dismissal Order Under Rule 60(b)(6), 10 CARDozo L. REv. 2137, 2137 (1989).
123. 9 U.S.C. § 16 (1988 Ed. Supp. IV).
124. See supra note I 8.
125. See generally Digital Equip. Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1992.
126. See supra note 119.
127. Janneh, 887 F.2d at 436.
128. Id at 435.
129. Id. at 434.
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30
be as effective as slamming the barn door after the horse has already bolted."'
Immediate appellate review of orders rescinding settlement agreements not only
"encourages and facilitates" the settlement process, it reinforces the importance and
legitimacy of the settlement agreement in the broader context of the judicial
system. In finding that the right to avoid trial is "effectively reviewable" and
"unimportant," the Digital decision fails to fully take into account the true benefits
of the settlement process. As the wealth of judicial opinions suggest, "[t]he
judiciary has strongly favored voluntary settlement of litigation by upholding and
Against this strong
enforcing settlement agreements whenever possible."''
judicial and societal policy, the Digital decision appears to be a step backwards.
Although the Digital court determined that the "right not to go to trial" is
insufficiently important to warrant immediate appeal, a conclusion not beyond
question, the Court recognized that there are other routes to obtain immediate
appellate review.'32 Although, as a practical matter, this result is encouraging,
the Digital opinion can still be seen as striking a blow to the furtherance of the
judicial and societal policy favoring settlement agreements.

VI. CONCLUSION
At the very least, Digital can be seen as a confrontation between two
diametrically opposed policies. On one side is the policy, as represented by
Digital, favoring maintaining the collateral order doctrine as a "narrow" exception
to the final judgment rule. On the other side, is the policy which seeks to further
facilitate out-of-court dispute resolution.' 33 Although the Supreme Court was
unwilling to extend the collateral order doctrine to include orders refusing to
enforce settlement agreements in the present case, future congressional action,
similar to 9 U.S.C. § 16, could reverse the effect of this decision. Until that time,
counsel seeking an interlocutory appeal of a district court's order refusing to
enforce a34 settlement agreement must do so by the traditional statutory
avenues.
S. CHRISTIAN MULLGARDT

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.at436.
See Weiss, supra note 122.
See supra note 119.
As representative of this policy, see supra note 14 and 118.
See supra note 50-5 1.
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